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Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs), such as
Progresa in Mexico or Bolsa Família in Brazil, have been compared
to a “magic golden bullet in development”. A plethora of rigorous
evaluations of such programmes points to a significant increase in
food consumption among cash-recipient households. A topic that
has not received much attention yet is the impact of cash transfer
programmes on the food consumption of households that do not
receive the transfer (programme-ineligible households) but that are
in the same village as cash recipients.
Why should we care about programme-ineligible households? In
many cases, funding for a CCT is limited. Hence governments and
non-governmental organisations often allocate transfers to the
most vulnerable groups of a population. But the vast majority
of those deemed ineligible for the programme are far from what
we would consider “well-off”. For example, the monetary value of
ineligibles’ daily per capita food consumption in Mexico’s Progresa
was less than US$1.0 when the programme started in 1997. Poverty
therefore persists even among ineligible households. If a CCT has a
positive food consumption spillover on ineligible households, the
overall impact on poverty is much greater than previously recorded.
Why would programme-ineligible households increase their food
consumption, even though they do not receive the cash transfer?
First, transfers increase the recipient households’ demand for goods
and services. This in turn changes prices and labour demand in the
community. If a programme-ineligible individual is a labourer, the
increase in demand for goods and services leads to more employment
opportunities, and thus additional income. If programme-ineligible
households are engaged in small business activities they benefit
from increasing prices (higher profits).
Second, the liquidity induced by a CCT improves credit markets
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). The consequent increase in access
to loans can be used to scale-up domestic agriculture, livestock
production and other small business activities.
Third, a CCT may lead to increases in informal food gifts from
programme participants to programme-ineligible households.
In the anthropology literature, this phenomenon is often referred
to as “solidarity”. The economic literature emphasises the importance
of in-kind sharing as a means of informal insurance against shocks
(illness, crop failures and so on). Households have an incentive to
share food with other households in order to receive help when
they themselves fall into precarious situations (the principle of
“reciprocity”). These and other important channels through which
a CCT affects ineligibles’ consumption are discussed in depth in
Lehmann (forthcoming).
Is the food consumption spillover pro-poor? Using data from
Mexico’s Progresa we analyse if poorer ineligible households or the
“better-off’ ineligible households benefit from the food consumption
spillover. We compare the average monthly per capita food
consumption of ineligible households in villages where households
receive cash transfers to that of ineligible households in villages
where there is no CCT. Our results suggest that the increase in food
consumption is greater for poorer ineligible households than for
“better-off” ineligible households. In general, the poorer the village
as a whole, the greater the spillover on ineligible households. The
food consumption spillover, therefore, benefits the very poor.
The figure visualises the relationship between the increase in
ineligible households’ monthly per capita food consumption and
their level of pre-programme poverty. The latter is represented by
a wealth multidimensional index. The lower the index, the higher
the level of poverty. Each dot represents the increase in food
consumption for a programme-ineligible household in our sample
(i.e., non-recipients of transfers) due to the existence of a cash
transfer programme in the village. The downward-sloping line
shows the trend. We see that poorer ineligible households benefit
more from the existence of a CCT in their village. Their increase in
food consumption is, on average, higher than that of “better-off”
ineligible households in the same village.
What are the implications? Evaluations of CCTs that focus entirely
on programme participants do not capture the overall community
impact on poverty. Poorer, programme-ineligible households
indirectly benefit from the programme through higher food
consumption, and thus the impact on poverty is greater than
previously recorded.
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